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Defining the Limits of the EU Essential Facilities 
Doctrine on Intellectual Property Rights:  
The Primacy of Securing Optimal Innovation 
James Turney* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The recent European Commission decision in the Microsoft case, imposing 
remedies and a fine of EUR 497.2 million on the computer giant, has done much to 
refocus attention on the essential facilities doctrine.1  The decision orders Microsoft 
Corporation to disclose interface information, enabling competitors to develop software 
that will be able to integrate with Windows.  For over fifteen years, the European Court 
of Justice (“ECJ”) has accepted that in certain exceptional circumstances, a refusal to 
supply a potential competitor with an essential facility can amount to a breach of Article 
82 of the EC Treaty.2  However, if the ECJ accepts the finding of the Commission, the 
Microsoft case will be the first to order a compulsory license over a patent developed 
through the resources of a private entity, and the decision will fuel the debate as to what 
extent it is desirable that competition law destabilizes the exclusive rights of intellectual 
property. 
¶2 The Microsoft Commission decision closely preceded the judgment by the 
European Court of Justice in the IMS case.3  IMS provided a suitable opportunity for the 
Court to establish a clear principle on essential facilities in the context of intellectual 
property rights.  It is probable that the ECJ has used this opportunity to lay the 
foundations for the impending Microsoft case, since the decision emphasizes the 
protection of right holders.  However, the IMS judgment is in many ways disappointing 
and leaves numerous questions unanswered.  This legal uncertainty is particularly 
problematic for market participants who remain unsure whether their predicted 
recuperation of innovative costs will be jeopardized by an order to license to a 
competitor. 
 
* The author is a Research Fellow at the Centre of European Law and Politics at the University of 
Bremen.  He studied law at the University of Bristol, England and received a Masters of European Law, 
magna cum laude, from the University of Stockholm. 
1 Commission of the European Communities, Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 (Case COMP/C-
3/37.792 Microsoft) [hereinafter Microsoft]. 
2 CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Dec. 24, 2002, 
O.J. (C 325) 65 (2002) [hereinafter EC TREATY].  See, e.g., Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Veng, 1988 E.C.R. 
6211. 
3 Case C-481/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG  v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 2004 O.J. (C3) 16 
(April 29, 2004) [hereinafter IMS]. 
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¶3 It has been argued that many of the problems in the essential facilities doctrine 
relate to the nature of the intellectual property right itself.  Often the claim to the right is 
dubious, its scope is too extensive, or the period for which the right is protected allows 
the undertaking to develop a real monopoly position.  Since the Court has refused to 
directly address the issue of the existence of intellectual property rights,4 it is arguable 
that, in the absence of harmonization measures, the essential facilities doctrine should not 
be extended to such rights.  However, if such a principle is allowed to emerge, it should 
be subject to a substantial cost benefit analysis, specifically considering the impact on 
innovation.  In any event, legal certainty must be returned to this area of law and suitable 
conditions established for competition to flourish. 
II. CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES 
¶4 The reconciliation of competing policy objectives is never an easy task, and where 
both seek to protect or encourage certain conduct, inevitably one side must prevail to the 
detriment of sound policy on the other.  This dilemma can be seen in the European 
Community within the context of essential facilities of intellectual property rights, where 
the arguments for strong intangible property rights clash with the efficiency arguments of 
competition law. 
¶5 In the case law and academic literature on the essential facilities doctrine, one can 
find many references to this conflict.  It is undoubtedly true that often the two areas of 
law appear to pursue differing objectives.  Intellectual property rights bestow on the right 
holder a virtual monopoly which can be exploited and abused.  They also enable the 
owner to prevent the production of derivative products which rely on access to the 
original intellectual property.  In contrast, competition law attempts to ensure that the 
efficiency of the market is not prevented by abuses of a dominant position. 
¶6 However, rights over intangible property do serve a valuable function within any 
developed economy.  Competition law and intellectual property rights should not always 
be in conflict since both are concerned with ensuring that there are optimum incentives 
and opportunities to invest in innovation.  The intellectual property right that is protected 
often requires extensive research and development costs, which the market participant 
will only undertake if it is likely to receive reasonable remuneration.  Competition law 
also tries to create the right market conditions that allow undertakings to develop more 
efficient methods of production or superior products which will result in a benefit to 
consumers.  Although each area of law will approach the question of optimal innovation 
in different ways, it is worth concentrating on these similarities and attempting to 
reconcile the disparities. 
A. The Characteristics of the “New” Economy 
¶7 As the economy of the European Union develops from one primarily based upon 
industry and agriculture to a service and technology economy, competition regulation 
 
4 Article 295 of the EC TREATY provides that “[t]his Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in 
Member States governing the system of property ownership.”  As a result the ECJ has separated the 
exercise of intellectual property rights from their existence and will not decide on the validity of the latter.  
See also Case 24/67, Parke Davis & Co. v. Probel and Centrafarm, 1968 E.C.R 55; AB Volvo v. Veng, 
1988 E.C.R. 6211. 
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must also mature to address problems within the “new” economy.5  The emergence of a 
technology-based economy means that dominance based on intellectual property is 
becoming more significant.  The witnessed advancements within the information 
technology industry have demonstrated how vital intellectual property rights can be in 
keeping an economic system dynamic. 
¶8 The new economy also has several other characteristics.  The costs of developing 
intangible property are generally higher, while the costs of reproduction are generally 
lower.  It is also apparent that the holder of an innovative right stands to reap 
considerable profits.  The goods produced within the new economy are usually durable, 
which leads to the unusual effect that the right holder will often be competing with its 
own old products by keeping the prices of superior products at a reasonable price.  
Technological products also produce network effects, so that a more widely used product 
yields greater consumer gains.  Finally, competitive races are common within the new 
economy, and monopolies over intellectual property rights are often fragile.6  For 
instance, the VHS video recording technology was long believed to have been an industry 
standard and its developers were required to license the patent to competitors.  However, 
the new DVD technology has seen VHS largely abandoned, with many retailers in 
Europe refusing even to stock the old equipment. 
B. The Objectives of Intellectual Property Law 
¶9 Intellectual property laws are concerned with the creation and commercial 
exploitation of a statutory grant of monopoly power.7  The innovator is rewarded for his 
creative effort and in this way is given an advantage over his competitors in the market.  
Denying the protection guaranteed by intellectual property rights would undermine the 
incentive to carry out research and development.  It would be irresponsible to endorse a 
system that allowed exploitation by free-riders.  Any competition law policy that seeks to 
achieve equal conditions for competitors to the detriment of dynamic efficiency is likely 
to do serious damage to the international competitiveness of the European Union. 
¶10 However, exclusive rights are always open to abuse and so their operation should 
be observed with caution.  To some extent, the anti-competitive effects of intellectual 
property rights are eased by temporal limitations.  However, often the same rules 
regarding existence should not be applied to all intellectual property rights and different 
markets require different approaches.  At the end of the period of exclusivity, the holder 
is obliged to allow free access to the right, restoring competition to the market.  However, 
in some intellectual property markets, the rate of technological advancement is so rapid 
that monopoly power represents the only form of exploitation.  In such circumstances the 
temporal limitation appears an unsuitable tool to achieve competitive markets. 
 
5 Christian Ahlborn, et al., Competition Policy in the New Economy: Is European Competition Law Up 
to the Challenge, 5 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 156 (2001). 
6 Id. 
7 Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal With Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law: A Small 
Contribution to a Necessary Debate, 13 E.C.L.R. 234, 244 (1992). 
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C. The Objectives of Competition Law 
¶11 Whilst the purpose of intellectual property rights can be clearly defined, the same is 
not necessarily true about competition policy.  At first glance, the objective of EC 
competition law is consumer welfare.  Indeed Mario Monti, the former European 
Competition Commissioner, declared that “the ultimate goal of the competition rules is 
simple: to assure that consumers benefit from new and improved products and lower 
prices.”8  Therefore, regulation should concentrate purely on exploitative abuses, and 
intervention should occur only where market conduct is likely to diminish aggregate 
consumer wealth.  This approach is evidenced in the United States where antitrust law is 
used to promote maximum efficiency and to reduce deadweight loss.9  However, it is 
apparent that consumer welfare is not the only objective that influences Community 
policy in this area and several other policy objectives can be identified.10 
¶12 First, the Commission appears determined to ensure the promotion of small and 
medium-sized business and to break up the anticompetitive effects of large privatized 
firms.11  Second, single market integration continues to influence much decision making 
in EC competition law.12  Third, the Commission seeks to ensure that there are fair 
conditions for competitors and has shown particular concern about the foreclosure of 
markets to potential competitors even where the benefits to consumers are doubtful.13  It 
is therefore apparent that EC competition policy also seeks to prevent practices which 
interfere with the market mechanism. 
¶13 The development of an essential facilities doctrine within the European Union is 
often viewed as a natural consequence to privatization and the desire to break up the 
dominance associated with such firms.  Indeed, the finding of a duty to share in 
infrastructure cases correlates to the duty of impartiality required of a public utility by 
Article 86 EC Treaty.  Following privatization, the opening up of important 
 
8 Mario Monti, Competition and Information Technologies, Speech before the Barriers to Cyberspace 
Conference, Kangaroo Group, Brussels (Sept. 18, 2000), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/00/315&format=HTML&aged=0&l
anguage=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Apr. 17, 2005). 
9 James B. Kobak, Jr., Running the Gauntlet: Antitrust and Intellectual Property Pitfalls on the Two 
Sides of the Atlantic, 64 ANTITRUST L. J. 341 (1995-1996). 
10 Ahlborn, supra note 5 
11 See, e.g., European Commission, First Report on Competition Policy (1972). 
12 "Restrictions on competition and practices which jeopardize the unity of the Common Market are 
proceeded against with special vigour."  Id. at 15. 
13 VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 81 (1997).  
Article 82 of the EC TREATY provides the following: 
1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or 
exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary 
to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 12 and 
Articles 81 to 89. 
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having 
the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this 
Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does 
not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them.  The 
development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests 
of the Community. 
3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this Article and shall, where 
necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to Member States. 
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infrastructures to competition could only be achieved if new competitors were allowed 
access.14  Therefore, the application of the essential facilities doctrine to intellectual 
property rights can perhaps be justified when the research and development was publicly 
funded in formerly nationalized industries.  In such cases an essential facilities doctrine 
can aid market liberalization.  However, the regulator must be cautious if applying the 
same principles when the property right has been privately financed.  Thus viewed, the 
essential facilities doctrine seeks to limit illegitimately obtained advantages.  Although 
the ECJ maintains that it does not have the competence to rule on the existence of 
intellectual property rights, many of the cases in this area have concerned dubious claims 
to exclusivity. 
¶14 European competition policy has also been used as a vehicle to integrate the 
common market.  Despite the ECJ’s assertions that it will only pronounce on the exercise 
of intellectual property rights, it is apparent that in certain cases the competition 
authorities have attempted to subordinate nationally granted intangible property rights in 
order to further the integrationist interests of the Community.  While it is a legitimate EC 
aim to ensure that the division of the common market is prevented, it is certainly 
questionable whether the grant of compulsory licenses over intellectual property is the 
correct method to achieve this goal. 
¶15 It is also apparent from EC jurisprudence that the need to maintain some form of 
equality between competitors influences competition policy.  By protecting the interests 
of competitors, it is more likely that compulsory licenses will be granted over intangible 
property rights.  The Microsoft example serves to illustrate this point more clearly.  The 
Windows operating system is of a high standard and available at such a competitive price 
that it has become a quasi consumer standard.  Nevertheless EC competition law has 
intervened where, due to its strong market position, Microsoft has imposed unfair 
conditions upon other market participants.15  However, as a matter of policy, competition 
law should not intervene to protect competitors unless the ultimate benefits to consumers 
outweigh the rights of the intellectual property right holder. 
¶16 Competition regulation which does not have consumer welfare as its primary goal 
is liable to lead to greater conflicts within the new economy.  The cost structure within 
the technological markets naturally leads to concentrations of market power.  Any 
attempt by regulators to artificially fragment the market will likely damage the efficiency 
of the industry to the ultimate detriment of consumers.  It is also apparent from its 
decisions that the Commission is highly skeptical of the network effects prevalent in the 
new economy and perceives this phenomenon as an unjustifiable barrier to entry.16  This 
view has been echoed by former Commissioner Monti who stated that “the more 
important the network becomes, the greater the risk that competition problems will 
emerge.”17  However, opening technology markets to competitors that only offer similar 
products to the right holder ignores the positive effects of networks for consumers. 
 
14 Derek Ridyard, Essential Facilities and the Obligation to Supply Competitors under the UK and EC 
Competition Law, 8 E.C.L.R. 438 (1996). 
15 Eleanor M. Fox, What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive Effect, 70 
ANTITRUST L. J. 371 (2002). 
16 See, e.g., Commission Decision of April 12, 2000 on Vodafone/Mannesmann Concentration, 2000 
O.J. (C 141) 19; Commission Decision of June 23, 2000 on MCI WorldCom/Sprint Concentration 2000 
O.J. (C 143) 4. 
17 Monti, supra note 8. 
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¶17 Despite assertions to the contrary, it would appear that consumer welfare often is 
not the only, or even the primary, goal of EC competition law.  By seeking to minimize 
the advantage that an undertaking gains through its own innovation or efficiency, the 
Commission is liable to damage the long-term advancements within the new economy.  It 
is acknowledged that competition law cannot intervene only in the face of exploitative 
abuses, since to do so would hinder the dynamic efficiency of the market.18  However, 
where regulation of the market occurs, there should always be tangible benefits to 
consumers.  It is possible for regulators to take a prospective view of the market and 
consider whether interference with the market mechanism will bring consumer gains.  
Concentrating on this sole policy objective will ultimately bring much needed coherence 
to the principle of essential facilities in intellectual property law. 
D. Theories on Essential Facilities 
¶18 It has already been stated that the primary objective of exclusive intangible 
property rights is to provide an incentive to innovate.  The constant search for a 
competitive advantage is an important dynamic in any developed economy, and market 
power acquired through business acumen or a superior product does not offend 
competition laws.  If other market participants are protected simply because they declare 
themselves beaten, innovation would be significantly hampered.19  Therefore any 
essential facilities doctrine must not condemn intellectual property rights simply because 
the holder obtains a competitive advantage, and the concept of “abuse” must be clearly 
defined. 
¶19 However, the owner of an intellectual property right also has a duty to ensure that 
its benefits are maximized.  As was stated by Sir Leon Brittan, companies “cannot 
unreasonably sit on their intellectual property in order to stifle enterprise and prevent the 
emergence of new forms of competition.”20  Nevertheless, this summary of the rationale 
for an essential facilities doctrine is vague and does not fully grasp the complexities of 
the problem.  If compulsory licenses to intellectual property rights are granted too easily, 
a right holder will be required to create its own competition.  To compel a firm to do so 
would be contrary to the very purpose of an intellectual property right, and therefore, 
regulation should only prevent firms from restricting competition, not requiring them to 
maximize it. 
¶20 Clearly, ordering a compulsory license whenever an undertaking has an advantage 
in the market is an unsatisfactory criterion upon which the essential facilities doctrine 
should be based.21  It is always pro-competitive to allow a company to exploit its 
legitimate advantages, although the converse is true where the benefit is used to exclude 
competition.  A right holder should be allowed to exploit the commercial advantage on its 
primary market.  It is only where a dominant firm seeks to lever its advantage onto an 
ancillary market that competition law should intervene.  Where that is the case, the 
 
18 Ridyard, supra note 14. 
19 Paul D. Marquardt & Mark Leddy, The Essential Facilities Doctrine and Intellectual Property Rights: 
A Response to Pitofsky, Patterson and Hooks, 70 ANTITRUST L J. 847 (2003). 
20 See Subiotto, supra note 7. 
21 See Ridyard, supra note 14. 
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regulator should examine the downstream market and consider whether competition can 
exist. 
¶21 Even where competition on a secondary market is restricted to such an extent, it is 
arguable that access should not be granted where the right holder is subject to effective 
competition in its primary market.  In such circumstances, the right holder is less likely to 
abuse its dominance on the secondary market since this will affect its competitiveness in 
its primary area of business.  Competition on the primary market will stimulate 
innovative developments and competitive prices on any ancillary markets because the 
right holder will strive to create the most successful overall package and thus dominate 
both markets.  Indeed, the right holder may wish to license its product and encourage 
competition in order to make its primary activity more appealing to customers.  Where 
the right owner chooses not to license, competition law should not impose business 
decisions on the market participant in the absence of any significant detriment to 
consumers. 
¶22 An interesting new theory is based upon the supposition that intellectual property 
law protects ideas, not products.  Thus, special protection should only be provided where 
the owner of a right truly denies access to its intellectual property.  This occurs when the 
right holder deprives someone who will actually use the exclusive right.  Accordingly, a 
competitor who seeks access to the owner’s protected parts cannot be considered to be 
willing to use the owner’s intellectual property.  Therefore, the right holder’s refusal 
cannot be justified on the grounds that the right incorporated in its products has patent 
protection.22 
¶23 Nevertheless, the extent to which this proposal ensures that there are adequate 
incentives to maintain a high level of innovation remains unknown.  The theory rests on 
the assumption that the right to exclusivity of the “invention” will stimulate the creation 
of new ideas.  However, the exact amount or form of incentives needed to create optimal 
ingenuity remains unanswered, and it is clear that the potential to exploit the advantage in 
ancillary markets certainly adds to the business desirability of innovative ideas. 
E. The Complications of Regulation 
¶24 Several practical problems can be identified in reconciling these differing 
objectives.  The precise relationship between intellectual property rights and economic 
welfare is unclear.  It is a notoriously difficult task to create a general rule that will limit 
the exclusivity of property rights when the cumulative benefits to consumers require it.  
Consequently, it is tempting to treat the essential facilities dilemma on a case-by-case 
basis.  However, this uncertainty is particularly problematic for market participants and 
does nothing to ensure the coherence of the competition regime. 
¶25 Even where a compulsory license is granted, a problem remains over defining the 
precise terms of the contract.  Obviously a right holder can expect reasonable royalties 
even where he is compelled to license the intellectual property.  However, whether this 
should be based upon the expected monopoly profit or the market value is unclear.  If the 
regulator is merely concerned with ensuring that new derivative products are not 
prevented from emerging, a license based on monopoly profits would enable competitors 
 
22 Mark R. Patterson, When is Property Intellectual? The Leverage Problem, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133 
(2000). 
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to penetrate the market without disturbing the right holder’s expected remuneration.  
However, if the creation of equal conditions for competition is the primary objective, a 
license based on market value is more suitable. 
¶26 Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent and to whom a right holder must license.  
An intellectual property right which is licensed to one competitor no longer forecloses the 
market to all competition.  Therefore, in circumstances where an essential facility is 
found to exist, a right holder could discharge his obligations by a single license.  Whether 
this is sufficient and how the licensee is to be chosen are unresolved questions for the 
competition authorities. 
¶27 An order of a compulsory license also requires constant supervision as to the terms 
upon which it is granted and whether the circumstances requiring the license continue to 
exist.  Such supervision is beyond the capacity of the Commission.  In addition, any 
regulation in this area must seek to minimize the intervention with the market 
mechanism.  It is a central tenet of modern economy theory that free markets create 
optimum efficiency, and therefore, an order to compulsorily license a product must be 
cautious about imposing artificial prices.  However, leaving the parties to find their own 
terms could lead to the setting of prohibitively high prices, thus negating the effect of the 
compulsory license.  Therefore, interference with the market is logically unavoidable 
once it has been decided that an essential facility exists.23  The recognition of these 
difficulties should ensure that the regulator proceeds with caution. 
III. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURTS 
¶28 Although the ECJ had developed the concept of an essential facilities doctrine in 
certain infrastructure cases,24 it was generally believed that intellectual property rights 
were immune from its impact.  This was, to a large extent, due to Article 295 EC Treaty 
which states that property rights remain within the sole competence of national law.25  In 
the case of Ab Volvo v. Veng,26 the Court initially affirmed that the specific subject matter 
of intellectual property was the right to “prevent third parties from manufacturing and 
selling or importing, without its consent, products incorporating the design.”  However, 
the Court further declared that in three circumstances a right holder can be compelled to 
license the property to third parties; in particular, where the owner “arbitrarily” refuses to 
deliver spare parts to independent repairers.27  This paradoxical approach cast 
 
23 Ridyard, supra note 14. 
24 See Joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94, European Night Servs. Ltd. v. 
Commission, 1998 E.C.R. II-3141 (with respect to tunnels); Commission Notice on the Application of the 
Competition Rules to Access Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector, 1998 O.J. (C 265) 2; Council 
Directive 90/547/EEC of 29 October 1990 on the Transit of Electricity Through Transmission Grids, 1990 
O.J.(313) 30 (with respect to telecom and electricity gridlines). 
25 “This Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property 
ownership.”  EC TREATY art. 295. 
26 1988 E.C.R. 6211. 
27 The exercise of a right holder’s exclusive right may be prohibited by Art. 82 where it involves: 
“certain abusive conduct such as the arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts to independent 
repairers, the fixing of prices for spare parts at an unfair level or a decision no longer to produce 
spare parts for a particular model even though many cars of that model are still in circulation, 
provided that such conduct is liable to effect trade between member states.”  Id. at para. 9. 
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considerable doubt upon the extent to which intellectual property rights were subject to 
competition scrutiny. 
¶29 It was not until the Magill case28 that the principle was developed, although the 
decision raised far more questions than it answered.  The judgment is of particular 
importance as it represents the only final decision where a compulsory license has been 
ordered by the ECJ.  Magill expands upon the “refusal to supply” abuse identified by the 
Court in Volvo and states that in certain “exceptional circumstances,” a right holder may 
be compelled to grant third party access to his property right.29  However, there is little 
guidance as to when the essential facilities doctrine will apply and, in the aftermath of the 
case, both the academic and business communities were left to speculate on the scope of 
the principle. 
¶30 In Magill, three television stations (RTE, ITV, and BBC) broadcasting in Ireland 
and Northern Ireland refused to license their copyright on the information contained in 
their respective program listings to the Irish publisher Magill TV Guide Ltd.  Magill then 
briefly attempted to produce its own television guide until the broadcasters invoked their 
copyrights to seek an injunction.  Magill complained to the Commission and the 
European process commenced.  The ECJ upheld the Commission and CFI decisions to 
order a compulsory license, drawing on the principle of exceptional circumstances. 
¶31 The ECJ first reaffirmed the principle from Volvo that the existence of an exclusive 
right is not, in itself, an abuse but then went on to hold that a right holder must grant third 
party access where three conditions were met.  First, there was no actual or potential 
substitute for a weekly television guide offering information on the week’s upcoming 
programs, despite a specific, constant, and regular consumer demand.  The broadcasters’ 
refusal to provide basic information, the “indispensable raw material” for compiling a 
weekly guide, prevented the emergence of a new product which would have competed 
with the broadcasters’ own guides.  Second, no business justification existed for the 
refusal, although this finding was not thoroughly discussed by the Court.  Third, the 
broadcasters had reserved for themselves a monopoly in the secondary market of weekly 
television guides by excluding all competition.30 
¶32 Magill caused considerable disquiet amongst the business community who feared 
that an expansive interpretation of the judgment could devalue their rights.  There was 
also concern that the holder of an improvement patent could demand access to the basic 
patent, since the Magill criteria seemed to be fulfilled.31  In response to these concerns, 
however, it should be noted that the anticipated floodgate fears have not materialized.  It 
 
28 Joined Cases C-241/91P and C-242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995 O.J. (C 137) 3. 
[hereinafter Magill]. 
29 The “exceptional circumstances” are stated by the ECJ in its McGill decision as: 
“Conduct of that type – characterised by preventing the production and marketing of a new 
product, for which there is a potential consumer demand, on the ancillary market of television 
magazines and thereby excluding all competition from that market solely in order to secure the 
applicant’s monopoly – clearly goes beyond what is necessary to fulfil the essential function of 
the copyright as permitted in Community law.”  1995 E.C.R. I-743 at para. 73. 
30 Cases C-241/91P & C-242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. I – 743 (Magill), 
at para. 73. 
31 Valentine Korah, The Interface Between Intellectual Property and Antitrust: The European 
Experience, 69 ANTITRUST L. J. 801 (2001). 
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is therefore apparent that the Commission does not believe that the current jurisprudence 
can support a wide application of essential facilities. 
¶33 Although the development of exceptional circumstances illustrated the 
circumstances in which a compulsory license would be ordered, considerable doubts 
remained.  It is possible that the ECJ’s failure to establish a clear principle emphasizes its 
desire not to confine itself doctrinally, although the most notorious legacy of the case will 
continue to be the legal uncertainty brought to this area of EC competition law.32  Clearly 
Magill demonstrates that competition law can take precedence over intellectual property 
rights, but it is ambiguous whether the case expanded upon the “refusal to supply” abuse 
as stated in Volvo or whether the exceptional circumstances were merely additional 
requirements which made the case against the television broadcasters more compelling.  
The issue of whether the requirements in Magill were cumulative became one of the most 
vexed questions in the essential facilities doctrine. 
A. New Product 
¶34 It has been argued by some commentators that the requirement that the competitor 
seeking a compulsory license should be offering a new product was an additional 
compelling factor in the Magill case and is not necessary in all situations of essential 
facilities within the context of intellectual property rights.33  This line of reasoning claims 
that the only requirements for a compulsory license to be ordered are that the facility is 
indispensable and that the right holder is the only source. 
¶35 Indeed, the partial adoption of this approach can be seen in the Ladbroke case.34  In 
that case, the Commission and the CFI refused to apply Magill to a situation where the 
undertakings holding the exclusive rights to televised pictures and audio commentaries 
on French horse races, and an undertaking holding the exclusive rights to market such 
performing rights in Austria and Germany, refused to license the right to retransmit such 
audiovisuals of French horse races to a Belgian betting agency.  The CFI distinguished 
Ladbroke from Magill finding that the license was not indispensable because sounds and 
images, although helpful, are not essential to a betting agency and that films are not 
indispensable since they are shown after the bets have been placed. 
¶36 However, the CFI also stated obiter that the Magill requirement of a new product 
was not cumulative.  It is apparent that if this approach were adopted, there would be a 
significant negative impact on innovation.  It is conceded that a compulsory license can 
be granted where an undertaking uses the intellectual property right to stifle innovation 
on that market.  In such circumstances the rationale for strong property rights becomes 
more difficult to justify, and consumer welfare is enhanced by allowing the benefits of 
competition to stimulate developments within the market.  However, regulation should 
not seek to ensure equality between competitors, and access to intellectual property 
should not be granted where a third party merely desires to copy the right holder’s 
product. 
 
32 Sergio Baches Opi, The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual Property 
Licensing in the European Union and the United States: Are Intellectual Property Rights Still Sacrosanct?, 
11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT L. J. 409 (2001). 
33 Frank Fine, NDC/IMS: In Response to Professor Korah, 70 ANTITRUST L. J. 247 (2002). 
34 Case T-504/93, Tierce Ladbroke SA v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. II-923. 
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¶37 Even if it is acknowledged that the requirement for a new product is an integral 
component of the Magill exceptional circumstances, identifying such a product is a 
difficult task.  It is conceivable that, in order to satisfy the test, the competitor must 
develop a product that will compete in a separate market to that of the right holder.  
However, such a high barrier to the essential facilities doctrine disproportionately favors 
intellectual property rights and would not protect consumer welfare. 
¶38 While it is conceded that the licensing of intellectual property where the third party 
is in direct competition with the right holder can, in some circumstances, benefit the 
consumer, the difficulty remains where the third party merely makes the same goods 
more cheaply or of a higher quality.  In such circumstances, there would also be a benefit 
for consumers, but to grant a compulsory license would significantly undermine the 
property right.  It is submitted that in order to qualify under the essential facilities 
doctrine, a third party must demonstrate that it has developed a distinct product from that 
of the right holder, but need not show that it will compete in a different market. 
B. Essential 
¶39 A further difficulty of the “exceptional circumstances” in Magill is the definition of 
what is essential.  The essential facilities doctrine does not require that equal conditions 
exist for all competitors; rather it provides a mechanism whereby competition may exist 
on previously foreclosed markets.  Consequently a duty to provide access to an facility 
should occur only where there is an insurmountable barrier to entry for competitors of the 
dominant company, or if, without access, competitors would be subject to a serious, 
permanent, and inescapable competitive handicap that would make their activities 
uneconomical.35  This approach appears to have been accepted by the Court, and the 
Oscar Bronner case,36 which does not actually concern intellectual property rights, 
represents the clearest example of the current limited application. 
¶40 Mediaprint, a publisher of two Austrian newspapers with a large market share, 
refused to grant its competitor, Oscar Bronner, access to its nationwide early-morning 
newspaper home-delivery network.  According to Oscar Bronner, Mediaprint bore a duty 
to grant access to its distribution network claiming that a dominant company is required 
to allow access to competitors in the downstream market unless refusal to supply can be 
objectively justified.  Oscar Bronner contended that the access requested was essential for 
its business since it was not economically feasible, due to the limited circulation of its 
newspaper, to establish its own distribution network. 
¶41 The Court held that the facility must be truly indispensable, that it is not possible 
for the competitor to replicate it, and that the refusal is likely to eliminate all competition 
on the market.  In rejecting Oscar Bronner’s argument, the Court observed that other 
forms of distribution existed which, while they were less favorable, did not lead to a 
finding that Mediaprint’s service was essential.37  In addition, the ECJ noted that no 
technical, legal, or economic obstacles existed that would make it difficult for any other 
 
35 John Temple Lang, Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies’ Duties to Supply Competitors and 
Access to Essential Facilities, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 437 (1994). 
36 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeinungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag Gmbh 
& Co. KG 1998 E.C.R. I-779. 
37 Id. at para. 43.  
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publisher to establish its own nationwide home-delivery scheme.38  The ECJ endorsed the 
reasoning of Advocate General Jacobs, holding that, for such access to be regarded as 
indispensable, a competitor has the difficult task of demonstrating the economic 
impracticality of creating a second newspaper delivery scheme with a circulation 
comparable to that of the existing scheme.39 
¶42 The decision recognizes that there will only be a negative impact on consumers 
where the right holder’s end product is sufficiently isolated from competition to give it 
market power.  Unless such circumstances can be shown to exist, competition law should 
not intervene.  The judgment in Oscar Bronner is sound and warns against the 
overzealous application of the essential facilities doctrine within the intellectual property 
rights context. 
C. Market Leverage 
¶43 Another requirement of the “exceptional circumstances” established in Magill was 
that the right holder should reserve the secondary market for its own exploitation.40  
However, it is unclear whether the right holder must lever its advantage onto a secondary 
market or if it is sufficient that the secondary market has been foreclosed to competition. 
¶44 It is submitted that the requirement that a right holder uses its monopoly position 
on the primary market in order to lever its dominance onto an ancillary market is indeed a 
vital component of the Magill test.  The essential facilities doctrine cannot be used to 
require compulsory licensing merely because the existence of the intellectual property 
right creates market power in the product.41  Where the right owner has invested research 
and development into the right, it should not be forfeited where it creates a competitive 
advantage, and therefore must be accompanied by some additional abuse.  Any other 
interpretation of the essential facilities doctrine would undermine the very substance of 
an intellectual property right.  Depriving an undertaking of its right to exploit on the 
primary market would interfere with the existence of the right, something that the ECJ 
has repeatedly stated it does not have the authority to do.  Furthermore, such a principle 
would reduce the incentive to invest in the development of such intellectual property 
rights.  A monopolist should be allowed to exploit its advantage to the maximum that the 
market will tolerate as a reward for its creativity and innovation. 
¶45 A broader interpretation of essential facilities also ignores the need to compensate 
the right holder for the risk undertaken by investing in an evidently valuable resource 
without being able to predict its financial profitability.  Indeed it has been argued that 
levering advantages are legitimate rewards, to which the right holder is entitled to the 
same extent as the primary market.42  However, in response it must always be bore in 
mind that no regulation requires the holder to grant free access to its competitors, and so 
the dominant company will always be compensated for its investment.  Nevertheless, it is 
only where innovation on the secondary market does not and cannot exist that 
competition concerns can outweigh the arguments in favor of incentives to invest. 
 
38 Id. at para. 44. 
39 Id. at para. 45. 
40 Magill, supra note 28, at para. 73. 
41 Marquardt & Leddy, supra note 19. 
42 Richard M. Brunell, Appropriablity in Antitrust: How Much is Enough?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2001). 
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¶46 It is also uncertain whether a compulsory license can be ordered where the right 
holder forecloses the secondary market to competition, rather than levering its advantage 
onto that market.  It is submitted that, with reference to the policy objective of fostering 
maximum innovation, a competitor can be granted access to the intellectual property right 
in such circumstances, although the requirement for a genuine new product remains. 
¶47 Advocate General Tizzano’s opinion in the IMS case, while affirming the need for a 
refusal to supply on a secondary market, stated that the intellectual property right itself 
constitutes a distinct market.43  According to this opinion, a market is identified where 
there is the potential to sell or license the product even if the owner declined to do so.  
Such a finding leads to the unacceptable conclusion that a right holder has levered its 
dominance onto an ancillary market, merely through exploiting the very subject matter of 
the right.  In effect, this proposal dispenses of the requirement for a two market situation 
and is consequently undesirable. 
D. Objective Justification 
¶48 In Magill, the Court stated that where the intellectual property right owner has an 
objective justification for refusing to allow access to an essential facility, a compulsory 
license would not be granted.44  However, no further guidance was provided as to which 
reasons the Court considers to be acceptable, and this remains the most elusive area of the 
judgment. 
¶49 It is clear that a third party must do more than demonstrate that the right holder 
possessed an anticompetitive intent, since all refusals to license are due to the desire to 
maintain a competitive advantage within the market.45  If this were not the case, the right 
would be licensed so that the owner could reap the benefits of any royalties.  
Consequently the intent of the dominant firm offers no definitive answers as to the 
circumstances where access can be compelled.  There is also no objective justification in 
a refusal to supply if the owner has never dealt with the third party before, since the 
importance of the essential facilities doctrine is that it is not limited to existing 
customers.46 
¶50 Indeed, it would appear that objective justifications may only be invoked where 
access to the facility would disrupt the business of the owner,47 for instance where a 
compulsory license would result in negative returns.  This is unlikely since such 
considerations would be accounted for when assessing the terms on which the license 
would be granted.  Access should also be denied where it would result in congestion in 
the facility.  This too is unlikely in intellectual property cases, since a license can usually 
be granted to an unlimited number of competitors.48  Finally the holder may be able to 
escape an obligation where the grant of a license would undermine the quality or safety 
standards associated in the market. 
 
43 Case C-418/01 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC 
GmbH & Co. KG, at para. 56-59. 
44 Magill, supra note 28, at para. 73. 
45 Marquardt & Leddy, supra note 19. 
46 Maurits Dolmans, Restrictions on Innovation: An EU Antitrust Approach, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 455 
(1998). 
47 Opi, supra note 32. 
48 Id. 
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E. Summary of the Case Law Prior to IMS 
¶51 It can be seen from the above discussion that, while the Magill case proposed 
certain criteria to identify where a compulsory license would be granted, the Court’s 
failure to establish a more principled approach has caused considerable uncertainty for 
business.  However, the open-ended nature of the judgment has resulted in extensive 
academic discussion, which has done much to focus attention on the dangers of pursuing 
an expansive interpretation of the essential facilities doctrine. 
¶52 Despite some assertions that the requirement for a new product and market leverage 
are not necessary for the grant of a compulsory license, it is submitted that such an 
approach demands caution.  The removal of these components of the test fails to 
recognize the important role that intellectual property rights play towards guaranteeing 
consumer benefits.  To apply the same criteria to intangible property rights as to the 
infrastructure cases overlooks the fact that incentives to innovate within the primary 
market in the latter are less compelling.  A high threshold for the essential facilities test in 
intellectual property rights will do more to ensure the long-term efficiency of EC 
technology markets. 
F. The IMS Case 
¶53 On April 29, 2004, the ECJ delivered its judgment in the IMS case,49 the latest 
litigation concerning the application of the essential facilities.  The judgment certainly 
does not represent the final word on the doctrine, nor was it expected to be.  However, the 
decision signifies the Court’s current opinion on the issue and appears to strongly assert 
the supremacy of intellectual property rights. 
¶54 IMS is the largest supplier in the world of information on sales and prescription of 
pharmaceutical products through a large number of small areas called bricks.  IMS 
divided its German territory into 1860 zones or bricks.  This division of the market 
enabled IMS to give its clients sales data while avoiding the identification of sales by 
individual pharmacies.  IMS was assisted in establishing the brick structure by the 
pharmaceutical companies, but it also contributed considerable work itself. 
¶55 IMS was the only firm providing regional data in Germany until, in 1992, NDC and 
AzyX entered the market and tried to base the information they supplied on different 
zones.  However, after discussions with customers, it became apparent that this would not 
be marketable since it did not correspond to the segments already in use.  The new 
entrants then started to use IMS’s 1860 brick structure until IMS successfully obtained an 
injunction. 
¶56 Despite the assertions of NDC and the Commission to the contrary, the ECJ 
unequivocally stated  that all the criteria of the “exceptional circumstances,” as stated in 
Magill, must be fulfilled in order for a compulsory license to by granted.50  In fact, the 
Court did not discuss the misleading obiter dictum in Ladbroke, which stated that the 
conditions were not cumulative, and it should be considered that the confusion created by 
 
49 Case C-481/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co.  v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG (2002). 
50 Id. at para. 38. 
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that case has now officially ended.  Instead the Court focused on the positive assertions in 
Magill and reaffirmed their importance.51 
¶57 Regarding the definition of essential, the Court repeated the assessment contained 
in the Oscar Bronner judgment that it should not be economically viable for a firm of 
comparable size to the right holder to produce a similar facility.52  The Court added that 
whether the participation by customers in the development of the facility constituted an 
additional barrier to the creation of a competing facility was a factor that should be taken 
into account by the national court when making its assessment of whether the copyright 
was essential.53 
¶58 The Court accepted the Advocate General’s opinion that regulation should balance 
the rights of the dominant firm with the need to ensure free competition in a derivative 
market.  Emphasis was placed on the need to ensure consumer welfare and it was only 
where consumer welfare was increased that the interests of competition would prevail.  
Consequently, the ECJ emphasized the requirement that a third party bring a new product 
to the market.  Unfortunately, the concept of a new product was not elaborated upon and 
remains for the national court to define. 
¶59 Finally, the ECJ affirmed the need for two markets in the determination of an abuse 
of refusal to supply.  However, it is only necessary to be able to identify a potential or 
hypothetical market.  Whether such circumstances exist in the present case was left for 
the national court to determine.  Since it is always possible to envision a potential market 
in the intellectual property itself, it is submitted that such an approach is inadequate and 
could lead to a finding of abuse where the right holder merely seeks to exploit the very 
product which is protected under intellectual property law. 
IV. DUBIOUS EXISTENCE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
¶60 Magill was certainly a seminal decision.  However, the vague nature of the 
judgment leads to the conclusion that the Court may have been influenced by factors 
other than those contained in the exceptional circumstances.  In particular, it appears that 
both the Court and the Commission were skeptical about the existence of the copyright in 
the case and believed it to be unworthy of protection. 
¶61 Traditionally, ECJ judges view Irish and UK copyright legislation, which protect 
“sweat of the brow” creations, with disfavor.54  Copyright laws are designed to 
encourage, protect, and reward creative innovation, whereas the copyrighted television 
listings held little literary merit.  Enforcing compulsory licensing for television listings 
did not significantly impact on the production and release of program listings since the 
copyright holders could not claim to have invested capital in the development of the 
intellectual property.  The incentive to produce and disseminate programs would be the 
 
51 Id. at para. 38. 
52 Id. at para. 28-29. 
53 Id. at para. 29. 
54 After the Magill judgment, there was much speculation that the Court had been influenced by the need 
to bring UK and Irish copyright law into line with the rest of Europe, where such TV listing could not be 
copyrighted.  
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same irrespective of whether the broadcasters were protected from competition in the 
television guide market.55 
¶62 Indeed, officials of the Commission’s legal service stated, in their personal 
capacities, that Magill should be limited to “unmeritorious kinds of intellectual 
property.”56  However, defining such intellectual property rights will once again prove 
difficult.  It is only in circumstances where the proposal is undeserving of exclusivity, 
since it was not created through the innovation of the undertaking or where the right is a 
byproduct of the business’ primary activity, that competition law may have a role 
promoting free access to the facility. 
¶63 The desire to prevent the exploitation of unmeritorious intellectual property can 
also be evidenced in the approach of the Commission in the IMS case.57  In that case, the 
1860 brick structure was nothing more than an aggregation of German postal codes in a 
manner designed to prevent the identification of sales to individual pharmacies, as this 
would violate German rules on data protection.  NDC and IMS are currently involved in 
German litigation concerning the copyrightability of the 1860 brick structure and, if this 
structure is indeed copyrightable, whether IMS is the legitimate owner of the right. 
¶64 The Commission’s finding that the 1860 structure represented an industry standard, 
which had been developed with the vital assistance of the pharmaceutical industry, was 
crucial since IMS’s assertion of a copyright represented much more than a first mover 
advantage.  In fact, the copyright was a semi-permanent barrier to entry, considering that 
the German pharmaceutical industry would not accept regional sales reports in any other 
brick structure.58  It should also be observed that the pharmaceutical companies could 
have agreed with IMS that they would assist the firm in developing the 1860 brick 
structure if IMS gave the reciprocal commitment to allow competition on the market for 
the provision of the service.  Competition law should not be used to rectify bad deals 
made by market participants. 
¶65 The Court has consistently retained the distinction between the existence and 
exercise of intellectual property rights and, out of deference to Article 295, will not 
question the validity of an intellectual property right.59  Indeed, despite fears that, with 
closer coherence within the internal market, the ECJ would look more restrictively upon 
intellectual property rights, the Hag II60 judgment shows that these concerns were 
speculative.  The judgments on spare parts in Volvo and Renault61 also demonstrated that 
the Court was not moving in that direction.62 
¶66 However, unless the ECJ is prepared to take the bold step and directly rule on the 
existence of the copyright, it is undesirable that the court considers the question of the 
legitimacy of the intellectual property right, and should instead concentrate on whether 
the tests for the exceptional circumstances principle have been fulfilled.  Even so, in the 
 
55 Opi, supra note 32. 
56 VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENT AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES 244-55 
(1996). 
57 IMS Health, 2004 O.J. (C3) at 20. 
58 Frank Fine, NDS/IMS: A Logical Application of Essential Facilities Doctrine, 23 E.C.L.R. 9 (2002) 
457-468. 
59 See, e.g., AG Volvo, 1988 E.C.R. at 6219. 
60 Case C-10/89, CNL-SUCAL NV v. Hag GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. I-3711. 
61 Case 53/87, CICRA et Maxicar v. Renault, 1998 E.C.R. 299. 
62 Subiotto, supra note 7. 
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absence of competence to confront the existence of intellectual property rights, the Court 
could be tempted to expand the essential facilities doctrine so that an order to grant a 
compulsory license can be made. However, such an approach is problematic for several 
reasons. 
¶67 Primarily, if the essential facilities doctrine is used as a tool to allow free access to 
intellectual property rights which are not deserving of protection, it will also capture 
rights which have a beneficial purpose for innovative efficiency and ultimately 
consumers.  Even if abuses of intellectual property occasionally occur, the beneficial 
effects of dynamic research and development outweigh the negative effects of imperfect 
competition.  After all, it is also one of the key aims of competition policy to increase 
innovation. 
¶68 Second, by pursuing a doctrine that limits the exclusivity of an intangible property 
right, the regulator de facto affects the existence of the right.  If a license to a right is 
granted in most circumstances where a competitor needs access in order to compete with 
the right holder, the advantages associated with national intellectual property protection 
will become illusory.  As a result, the Court’s distinction between the exercise and 
existence of the right will become inconsequential. 
¶69 Third, the EC competition regulators are no more equipped to determine the 
existence or scope of an intellectual property right than the national authorities.  In the 
absence of a coherent European program determining the minimum standard of 
qualification for and the duration of a period of exclusivity, the haphazard striking down 
of the vital protection will send a damaging message to the market.  Concrete standards 
must be established so that a right holder can be confident of recouping its investment 
costs. 
¶70 Finally, a judicial rule that disguises its true reasoning stands to do considerable 
damage to businesses.  It may be that the Court will only apply an expansive 
interpretation of the essential facilities doctrine in cases where exclusive protection is 
debatable.  However, businesses may perceive this approach as a threat to their 
legitimately obtained advantages.  The threat of a compulsory license will have just as 
damaging an effect on innovation in the market as the obligation itself, and undertakings 
will be discouraged from technological advancements within the EC or even entering the 
European market if they perceive that the regulator is pursuing an expansive policy to 
essential facilities within the context of intellectual property rights.  As a matter of policy, 
it is irresponsible to send unclear messages, upon which business plans are formulated, to 
the market. 
¶71 It has been argued that implicitly tackling the issue of the existence of rights is a 
hazardous method of dealing with the essential facilities question.  However, directly 
approaching the matter would do much to add to the coherence of the law.  Many of the 
problems the Court has faced have been due to the differing qualification standards for 
exclusivity within the EU.  Consequently, the adoption of a Union-wide intellectual 
property program, which ensures that minimum standards must be met in order to qualify 
for protection, would strike at the foundations of the essential facilities dilemma. 
¶72 Any such proposal should include considerations concerning the nature of the right 
which is to be protected.  It is clear that a uniform approach to all intellectual property 
rights fails to take into account that all rights have different characteristics.  The duration 
of the period of exclusivity should primarily be determined by the speed of development 
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within the market.  In the information technology sphere, for example, where innovation 
is typically rapid and dominance based on a particular right can often be deceptive and 
fragile, the owner of an essential facility should have strong property rights but for a 
limited duration.  This would ensure that the incentives to develop important facilities are 
not diminished and allows a period of exploitation to recoup expenses, but also affords 
competitors the opportunity to enter the market with improvements on a derivative 
market before the essential facility has become redundant. 
¶73 The grant of an intellectual property right should also consider the amount of 
capital invested in the development of the facility and the probable period needed by the 
undertaking to make a reasonable return on the product.  Certainly the current practice, 
which has often been allowed to continue unchecked by national authorities, of drawing 
wide patent specifications in order to achieve exclusivity over several potential markets 
must be addressed and prevented.63 
¶74 By tailoring the grant of an intellectual property right in this way, the competition 
authorities would do much to remove the need for an essential facilities doctrine 
altogether.  Undertakings would be provided with predictable rules to forecast the 
recovery of expenditure, aware that during that period strong rights would be guaranteed, 
yet the right holder would not be able to restrict developments on either ancillary or even 
the primary market. 
V. THE PRIMACY OF INNOVATION CONSIDERATIONS 
¶75 Where a competition regime encroaches on the exclusivity guaranteed by 
intellectual property law, the regulator should consider the prospective benefits of such a 
policy.  It is clear that a compulsory license should not be applied in such a way as to 
stifle desirable activity.64  In order to safeguard the international competitiveness of the 
European Union, there should be sufficient financial incentives to encourage a high level 
of innovative movement.  This view was reflected by the EC Commission in 1992, when 
it was stated that: 
Although it could be argued that consumers would benefit in the short 
term if intellectual property rights were compulsively licensed to serve as 
the basis of standards, in the long term, investment in research and 
development in the standardised industrial sectors would dry up within the 
Community.  Non-Community entities with extensive research activities 
would be encouraged to keep their technology out of Community markets, 
while low cost manufacturing centres outside the Community would 
benefit from cheap licenses to use Community technology.65 
¶76 Since competitive markets, as well as exclusive protection of intellectual property 
rights, act as a spur to innovation, the regulator must become involved in the balancing of 
difficult concepts.  Competitive practices must be analyzed for their prospective impact 
on developments within the market, as firms compete on innovation as much as price.  
 
63 Korah, supra note 56. 
64 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2002), 111. 
65 See IPR Commission Communication, COM 92/445, at ¶ 5.1.15 (1992). 
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But at what stage does competition create more incentives to develop a facility than the 
prospect of monopoly returns?  Inevitably competition policy must consider the impact 
on both long-term and short-term innovative efficiency. 
¶77 As Sullivan and Jones contend, the “evils” of a monopoly must be considered in 
context.66  When regulation is viewed ex post, the more efficient solution is to demand 
that prices are related to cost.  However, the competition authorities must also consider 
the ex ante constraint and social goals; namely, encouraging firms to be dynamic and 
efficient by tolerating monopolies when attained by such conduct.67  After all, a 
monopoly supplier based on an essential facility is preferable to no facility at all, and 
there must be sufficient incentives to ensure the creation of such valuable components of 
the economy. 
¶78 The most important incentive to innovate is the prospect of future profits.  In 
technology markets, where the sunk costs in research and development are generally 
high, the expectation of elevated returns is a necessary spur to gain a competitive 
advantage.  However, other factors despite the possibility to exploit the right will 
encourage a dominant firm to innovate.  These include the fear of losing its dominant 
market position if improvements and developments are not made to the essential facility 
or within derivative markets.  A right holder may also increase profits by creating more 
efficiencies in the manufacture of its goods.  Nevertheless, these considerations are 
unlikely to significantly persuade a firm to innovate if the potential to exploit the product 
is diluted. 
¶79 However, innovation is an important dynamic in both the primary and derivative 
markets, and the benefits of short-term innovation should always be considered.  By 
allowing access to essential facilities, competition will be encouraged in ancillary 
markets to that of the intellectual property right, bringing the associated benefits of 
increased choice, lower prices, and higher quality.  In circumstances where the essential 
facility has become so entrenched that it amounts to a consumer standard, allowing 
access may prove to be the only way to refresh the market with competitive practices. 
¶80 When considering the economic arguments for the correct application of the 
essential facilities doctrine, the inherent difficulty is that the principle is likely to punish 
the most important inventions.68  If the intellectual property right is unique, valuable, and 
difficult to duplicate, it is more likely to create a monopoly position on the primary 
market, and the obligation to share is more compelling. However, such facilities have a 
central role in the technological advancement of the Community and should be 
accompanied with the greatest incentives to invest in research and development. 
¶81 It is conceded that participation in the new technology market is generally 
characterized by large market shares, however, it is also apparent that this dominance can 
often be deceptive.  Often an essential facility in these markets is continuously under 
threat and the right holder is compelled to constantly keep under review or develop its 
primary product.  Technology markets, in particular, are dynamic and ways are often 
found to circumvent what was previous believed to be an industry standard.  If access to 
 
66 Lawrence Sullivan & Ann Jones, Monopoly Conduct, Especially Leveraging Power from One Product 
or Market to Another, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 165, 67 (Thomas M. 
Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992).  
67 Id. 
68 Marquardt & Leddy, supra note 19. 
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the facility is granted too easily, it will replace the incentive for the creation of other 
products that could compete in the primary market alongside that of the right holder.  
This contention is particularly persuasive where the competitor acknowledges that it is 
theoretically possible to develop its own facility, but claims it would be too costly, 
lengthy, or unpredictable.  The long-term interests of the market are served by requiring 
increased innovation towards the establishment of more facilities with their own 
derivative markets. 
¶82 It is therefore submitted that the competition regulator should concentrate on 
ensuring innovative efficiency after considering the long-term and short-term benefits of 
allowing access to an essential facility.  In this regard, the Court should consider whether 
the intellectual property right is entrenched as an industry or consumer standard, or 
whether developments within the market are still practically possible.  Justification for a 
compulsory license can be made where competition can only be achieved by opening up 
derivative markets to competitors. 
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE 
¶83 The above discussion has highlighted the importance of maintaining a sustainable 
level of innovation within the European Union.  It is argued that this criterion, above all 
others, should be the standard against which the competition authorities base their policy 
regarding the essential facilities doctrine.  The few cases that have come before the 
European Court can be characterized by well-formulated economic analysis by the 
Advocate General proceeded by vague statements of principle by the Court.  Such an 
approach is misleading and can have damaging consequences for market participants. 
¶84 Much of the case law and academic opinion has concentrated on the leverage of a 
dominant position onto an ancillary market.  As a result, it has to be assessed whether 
there is a primary market upon which the right holder has a virtual monopoly.  However, 
such an approach fails to recognize that the intellectual property right itself constitutes its 
own market, since there is always a potential to sell or license the right without actually 
making any products from the invention.  Therefore, the regulator should concentrate on 
the market in question and consider whether it is included within the scope of the right.  It 
is submitted that the following proposal seeks to offer a workable set of principles which 
protect intellectual property rights, while ensuring that dynamic efficiency is guaranteed. 
¶85 It can be seen from an examination of the case law that there are two different kinds 
of markets that are based on intellectual property rights.  First, where the product market 
is an additional consequence of the right, and second, where the product market amounts 
to the very essence of the exclusive right.  In the latter case, the right holder can expect a 
higher standard of protection to his exclusivity.  This principle applies in an equal 
manner, regardless of whether the market to which a third party requests access is the 
primary business of the right holder or a secondary market. 
A. The Market is an Additional Consequence of the Right 
¶86 It is often the case that an intellectual property right bestows upon the holder 
exclusivity over a market which is additional to that for which the invention was 
developed.  In such circumstances, the arguments in favor of long-term innovation are 
surpassed by the need to ensure development in the ancillary market, since the right 
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holder will be recompensed by the predicted returns on the intended market.  
Consequently the incentives to invest in such essential facilities will not be undermined 
by the grant of access to third parties. 
¶87 However, it should be stated that, where the market under scrutiny is an additional 
consequence to the main activity of the right holder, it is still important that new facilities 
are developed where possible, and the facility should be truly essential for there to be an 
order of a compulsory license.  Therefore, it should not be viable for a firm equivalent in 
size to the right holder to be able to develop a competing facility, having regard to the 
costs, time, and predictability of such a course of conduct.  Nevertheless, where these 
circumstances are satisfied, it is argued that there is no need for a third party to 
demonstrate that it can offer a new product, since the right holder has no incentive to 
invest in developing products within the ancillary market.  Short-term efficiency is 
improved by opening up such markets to competition. 
B. The Market is the Essence of the Right 
¶88 Where the market in question amounts to the very essence of the protected right, 
different principles must be considered.  It is possible that the intellectual property right 
covers more than one market which can be exploited.  Clearly an undertaking will only 
inject the large sunk costs into the research and development of an invention that 
encapsulates its primary business if the prospects for remuneration are high.  Regulation 
of these markets should therefore proceed with caution. 
¶89 Once again, the facility in question should be truly essential and it should not be 
possible for a similar competitor to develop a competing facility.  However, there should 
also be an additional consideration as to whether the facility is entrenched in the market.  
Even where it is not possible to develop a similar facility, dominance in certain markets, 
particularly within the technology industry, is often fragile.  Obviously the regulator 
cannot perfectly predict how the market will develop.  However, where the market is 
considered to be innovatively dynamic, a presumption should be raised that the 
dominance is precarious.  In such cases, a compulsory license should not be granted, as 
the right holder may not be able to exploit the advantage for the full period of exclusivity. 
¶90 Notwithstanding that the facility is essential and entrenched, it is of vital 
importance in cases where the market is the essence of the intellectual property right that 
a third party requiring access can produce a new product.  A right holder should be 
allowed to exploit its legitimately obtained advantages unless there are tangible short-
term benefits to consumers.  While there is no need for a “new” product to amount to a 
separate market in itself, it should be clear that mere improvements to the right owner’s 
product or reduced costs do not add sufficiently to the level of innovation.  Pursuing such 
a policy also encourages the right holder not to sit on its property rights, but to continue 
seeking a competitive advantage.  Therefore, where the dominant firm provides the 
highest quality and most developed products, no third party can demand access to the 
essential facility. 
¶91 The refusal to license the intellectual property right must be liable to eliminate all 
competition on the market.  This requirement is necessary because where competition 
does exist, the addition of one more market participant will not add significantly to 
competition.  Competition law should not be used in this way to protect competitors 
unless there are consumer benefits. 
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¶92 Finally, it must be considered whether the right holder is subject to effective 
competition within the intellectual property market itself.  It is feasible that the right 
holder does not hold a monopoly over the market, although it is dominant in derivative 
markets.  In such cases, competition within the intellectual property market will act as 
both a price regulator and a spur to innovation on any derivative markets since the right 
holder will aspire to dominant all markets based on the right.  As a result, no compulsory 
licenses should be granted in circumstances where the market in question is the essence 
of the right and the holder is subject to effective competition on the intellectual property 
market. 
C. Summary of the Proposal 
¶93 This proposal dispenses with the need to have a market leveraging aspect to the 
essential facilities doctrine since it focuses on the market to which the competitor 
requires access and questions whether this is included within the scope of the intellectual 
property right.  Once this has been established, the regulator can concentrate on the 
differing tests concerning the rigidity of the market and the potential short-term gains of 
the competitor’s new product.  It therefore allows the right holder to exploit its advantage 
with long-term and short-term efficiency gains.  The proposal also circumvents the 
problems associated with the dubious nature of certain intellectual property rights. 
¶94 However, it is conceded that this proposal also has its own short-comings.  
Uncertainty still persists with the identification of a truly new product and whether an 
essential facility is fragile.  It is also apparent that, by treating dissimilar intellectual 
property rights in a different manner, the Court will be seen to be regulating the existence 
of such rights.  Nevertheless, this particular issue is central to the essential facilities 
problem.  It would be more responsible for the Court to approach this concern directly in 
a way that seeks to reconcile the differences between the objectives of competition and 
intellectual property policy than to implicitly subvert national intellectual property laws. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
¶95 On March 24, 2004, the Commission announced its intention to impose the largest 
fine in EC competition law history on Microsoft.69  The decision finds two instances of 
abuse by the information technology giant; that of tying its audio-visual provider 
Windows Media Player to the Windows operating system to the detriment of rival 
operators, and failing to release key programming code to competitor servers to enable 
their computer systems to properly interact with Windows software.70  Clearly the latter 
conclusion is based on a refusal to supply intellectual property information. 
¶96 The European Court of Justice will be faced with a historic dispute.  In particular, 
the Court must be mindful that the intellectual property right in question has only been 
developed through the investment of vast sums into the Microsoft project.  A restrictive 
decision in such a high-profile case would send shock-waves through the European 
technology industry.  It is therefore vital that the Court does not undermine the incentives 
to undertake such valuable projects.  After all, although Microsoft has a long history of 
 
69 Microsoft, COMP/C-3/37.792. 
70 Id. 
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exploiting its dominant position on the information technology market, its products are 
traditionally of a high quality and are offered at competitive prices.  Consequently, it is 
doubtful that, through penalizing Microsoft, there would be many tangible consumer 
benefits. 
¶97 The IMS case left both of the Microsoft parties speculating about its effect on their 
case.  Both sides have claimed that the decision supports their main contentions.  A 
spokesman for EU competition commissioner Mario Monti welcomed the IMS judgment, 
stating that “[the court] has defined the exceptional circumstances where the refusal of a 
license by a dominant company could be considered an abuse.  And we consider that 
these exceptional circumstances . . . should also be fulfilled in the Microsoft case.”71  
However, it is clear that no definitive opinion can be reached given the complexities of 
the case and the nature of the IMS decision.  Nevertheless, the ECJ in IMS may have been 
anticipating the impending Microsoft case, and the judgment seems to signify that the 
importance of intellectual property rights is beginning to take precedence. 
¶98 Throughout European businesses, there is a widespread concern that a broad 
application of the essential facilities principle could have significant consequences.  It 
would appear that both the Commission and the ECJ are aware that the implications of a 
decision undermining the importance of intellectual property rights could be severe.  
However, the failure of the Court to establish more concrete principles in order to 
determine when a compulsory license should be granted continues to give cause for 
concern when investing in the development of new ideas. 
¶99 The dubious nature of some intellectual property rights has been the main catalyst 
for the development of an essential facilities doctrine.  It is futile to pretend that every 
right is equally valuable, equally sacrosanct, and equally deserving of immunity or 
tolerant treatment under the competition rules.72  It is implicit in the ECJ’s judgment in 
Magill and the Commission’s decision in IMS that the existence of the right itself was 
objectionable.  If the rights in question were patents, which were the result of 
considerable research and development, it is submitted that different decisions would 
have been reached.  However, the resolution of this point in the Microsoft case should not 
prevent EU harmonizing regulations.  A Community-wide regime that establishes 
minimum criteria for the existence of intellectual property rights based on the economic 
and social value of the innovation could dispense with the need for an essential facilities 
doctrine altogether. 
¶100 In the meantime, or in the absence of such an initiative, when considering the 
circumstances in which a compulsory license can be granted, the Court should be mindful 
of the need to ensure dynamic innovative efficiency.  Encroachment into national 
intellectual property rights would be more acceptable if there was a thorough examination 
of the effects on long-term and short-term development of the technology industry.  In 
any event, competition law should take precedent only where it can be demonstrated 
there will be a tangible consumer benefit. 
 
71 Simon Zekaria, IMS Ruling does not contradict Microsoft, says EU, EUPolitix (April 2004), at 
www.eupolitix.com/EN/News/200404/e96b7074-1ea1-470f-80eb-7649a2acbe99.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 
2005). 
72 Ian Forrester, EC Competition Law as a Limitation on the Use of IP Rights in Europe: Is there Reason 
to Panic (June 2003) (paper presented at the Eighth Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, 
European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies) (forthcoming 2005). 
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¶101 Although it is probable that the EC competition authorities consider that the grant 
of a compulsory license should be limited to very rare instances of abuse, the ambiguity 
of the Court’s rulings will be interpreted by market participants as a threat to their 
exclusivity.  As a result, innovators will proceed with caution and the prospects of third 
party access being granted to facilities will be factored in as a risk in business 
calculations.  The Microsoft case will provide the Court with a timely opportunity to 
establish a clear principle that rewards the most valuable innovations, while also 
preventing the right holder from stifling creativity in derivative markets to the detriment 
of consumers. 
